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BARGAINING WITHOUT THE BLINDFOLD: 
ADAPTING CRIMINAL DISCOVERY 
PRACTICE TO A PLEA-BASED SYSTEM 
ALEX KARAMBELAS† 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2015, Terrell Gills was arrested on charges related to a 
Dunkin’ Donuts robbery in Queens, based on a partial DNA 
match.1  His attorney’s investigation yielded news articles about 
two other Dunkin’ Donuts robberies in the same area, which took 
place in the same week.2  In the eighteen months following his 
arraignment, Mr. Gills was incarcerated at Rikers Island because 
he was unable to afford his $10,000 bail.3  During that period, Mr. 
Gills’s attorney made repeated requests for information related 
to the other two robberies.4  It was not until four days before trial 
that the prosecution disclosed reports from the arresting officers 
which revealed that a different defendant had been arrested and 
pleaded guilty to the other two robberies.5  Upon being inter-
viewed by Mr. Gills’s attorney, the other defendant confessed to 
the third robbery with which Mr. Gills was charged.6  The trial 
went forward, and Mr. Gills was acquitted.7 
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and insights, as well as my friends, family, and my inspiring colleagues in the St. 
John’s evening program for all their support. Lastly, I am forever thankful to Paul 
Magel for his unconditional love and encouragement throughout my time in law 
school. 
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Mr. Gills’s case is an outlier not because discovery was with-
held until less than a week before trial, but rather because he did 
not plead guilty.8  Statistically, in the vast majority of cases, a 
defendant in Mr. Gills’s situation would have taken a guilty plea, 
which would have included a waiver of the right to discovery.9  
New York Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) article 245, which 
came into effect in January 2020, introduced sweeping changes to 
criminal discovery procedure in New York, which would have 
prevented the eighteen-month delay before the disclosure of 
arrest reports.10 
This Note argues that pretrial discovery practice should shift 
from a trial-centric model to one focused on broad pre-plea disclo-
sures through statutory reform.  Part I of this Note compares the 
old New York discovery statute and federal discovery practice 
with the recent New York discovery reforms.  Part II surveys the 
various approaches to discovery procedure in practice, both in 
New York, under CPL article 240, and at the federal level, under 
Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.  Because 
both Rule 16 and CPL article 240 are so restrictive, informal 
practices and local rules have developed to fill the practical gaps 
left by these provisions.  Part III argues that the problem of 
adapting discovery practice to a plea-based criminal justice 
system is best solved through legislative reform efforts, rather 
than piecemeal policies and local rules.  Part IV addresses the 
role played by discovery in the plea negotiation process.  This 
Part argues that broad pre-plea disclosure serves to ensure that 
plea agreements are informed, accurate, and efficient.  
I.  BACKGROUND: DISCOVERY PRACTICE IN 
NEW YORK AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 
Except with specific and limited exceptions, criminal discov-
ery is a creature of statute.  Defendants have no constitutional or 
common law right to general discovery in a criminal case.11  Since 
1979, New York criminal discovery has been governed by CPL 
article 240.12  Criminal justice reforms, addressing discovery, 
 
8 See infra note 142 and accompanying text.  
9 See infra note 144 and accompanying text. 
10 See generally N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 245.20 (McKinney 2019).  
11 United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 629 (2002); see also Wardius v. Oregon, 
412 U.S. 470, 474 (1973). 
12 Criminal Procedure Law, ch. 412, § 2, 1979 N.Y. Laws 1 (repealed 2019).  
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speedy trial, and bail, were passed in April 2019.13  The new 
discovery statute in CPL article 245 represents a sea change in 
New York criminal discovery practice and the overall balance of 
power in pretrial procedure.  
A. New York Discovery Practice Under the Old Statute 
The discovery procedures set forth in article 240 were among 
the most restrictive in the nation, in terms of both the scope and 
the timing of disclosures.14  The discovery process under article 
240 was demand-based—rather than automatic—meaning that 
the discovery process began with a written demand from the 
defense and the scope of the required disclosures was limited.15   
The right to discovery was only triggered after the filing of a 
felony indictment or misdemeanor information.16  The Appellate 
Division has held that defendants have “ ‘no right to discovery 
prior to indictment,’ statutory or otherwise.”17  For misdemean-
ors, this restriction can result in a defendant who has no right to 
discovery material for ninety days following arraignment; a felo-
ny defendant could have no right to discovery for as long as six 
months.18  This period immediately after arrest is crucial both for 
effective defense investigation and plea bargaining, because pros-
ecutors often offer plea agreements prior to the filing of an 
indictment or information.19   
Pretrial access to discovery outside the procedures in article 
240 was dependent on the internal policies of the District Attor-
ney’s office for each county.  A preliminary hearing prior to indict-
ment, sometimes called a probable cause hearing or a felony 
exam, could provide the defense with detailed information about 
 
13 See Christian Nolan, New York Removes the Blindfold, N.Y. ST. B.J., May 
2019, at 12, 12.  
14 N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON CRIMINAL DISCOVERY 2–
3 (2015), https://nysba.org/app/uploads/2020/02/Criminal-Discovery-Final-Report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/S3DS-6HXH] [hereinafter NYSBA REPORT]; see also N.Y.C.L. UN-
ION, DISCOVERY IN THE DARK: NEW YORK’S SECRET EVIDENCE RULES 17–22 (2019), 
https://nyclu.org/sites/default/files/discoveryinthedark_2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/42P9-
V4S7]. 
15 See ch. 412, § 2, 1979 N.Y. Laws at 1–2.  
16 Id. 
17 People v. Reese, 23 A.D.3d 1034, 1035 (4th Dep’t 2005) (quoting People v. 
Walker, 15 A.D.3d 902, 903 (4th Dep’t 2005)). 
18 Jenny Roberts, Too Little, Too Late: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, the Duty 
To Investigate, and Pretrial Discovery in Criminal Cases, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 
1097, 1128 & nn. 141–42 (2004).  
19 Id. at 1128–29.  
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the prosecution’s case.20  However, such hearings are rarely used, 
as prosecutors generally choose the less onerous grand jury pro-
ceeding.21  In addition to such preliminary hearings, defendants 
could receive substantive early discovery through voluntary 
disclosure by the prosecution.  As discussed in more detail in 
Part III, some counties adopted internal “open file” discovery pol-
icies.  However, the extent of the materials produced during 
voluntary disclosures varied from county to county and prose-
cutor to prosecutor.22 
The timeline for critical discovery under article 240 was tied 
to trial rather than arraignment.  By contrast, the new statute 
introduces a deadline which starts from the date of arraignment, 
including on a felony complaint.  The treatment of Rosario mate-
rial illustrates how critical discovery material was treated as a 
trial right under article 240.  Rosario is a judicially created rule, 
later codified in CPL section 240.45, that requires the disclosure 
of prior recorded statements of prosecution witnesses made to the 
police, the prosecution, or the grand jury.23  For witnesses testify-
ing at a hearing, their prior statements did not need to be 
disclosed until “prior to the commencement of the direct 
examination.”24  For trial witnesses, CPL section 240.45 did not 
require the prosecution to disclose Rosario material until after 
the jury had been sworn and prior to the prosecution’s opening 
statement.25  As such, defendants had no right to Rosario mate-
rial until after the trial or hearing had already commenced, 
making any investigation based on that information impracti-
cable. 
Similar to the timing of Rosario material, the disclosure of ex-
culpatory evidence under Brady was tied to the trial timeline and 
 
20 Id. at 1124. 
21 Id. at 1124–25. Notably, during the COVID-19 pandemic, prosecutors were 
forced to use preliminary hearings, when it became impractiable to convene grand 
juries. See Paul McDonnell, N.Y.’s Legal Limbo: Pandemic Creates Backlog of 39,200 
Criminal Cases, N.Y. TIMES (June 22, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/22/ 
nyregion/coronavirus-new-york-courts.html [https://perma.cc/5WUZ-PHZ7] (“Unable 
to convene grand juries, the city’s five district attorneys are turning instead to 
preliminary hearings, which have not been conducted in New York in decades.”).  
22 See N.Y. CNTY. LAWS.’ ASS’N, DISCOVERY IN NEW YORK CRIMINAL COURTS: SUR-
VEY REPORT & RECOMMENDATIONS 10–12 (2006), https://www.nycla.org/siteFiles/ 
Publications/Publications228_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/5X64-AK6C] [hereinafter NYCLA 
SURVEY]. 
23 People v. Rosario, 9 N.Y.2d 286, 289 (N.Y. 1961); People v. Gillis, 220 A.D.2d 
802, 805 (3d Dep’t 1995).  
24 Criminal Procedure Law, ch. 412, § 2, 1979 N.Y. Laws 3 (repealed 2019). 
25 Id.  
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took place late in the process under the old statute.  Although 
there was no fixed timeline for Brady disclosures in article 240, 
such disclosures were considered “presumptively ‘timely’ ” if they 
were made no less than thirty days prior to the commencement of 
trial for a felony, and no less than fifteen days prior to trial for a 
misdemeanor.26  These trial-centric timing requirements under 
article 240 resulted in meager pre-plea disclosures. 
The challenges presented by the timeline for discovery under 
the old statute were compounded by the narrow scope of discover-
y available to defendants.  The scope of discovery available to the 
defense under article 240 was limited to eleven enumerated 
categories of materials.27  The Court of Appeals held that “[i]tems 
not enumerated in article 240 are not discoverable as a matter of 
right unless constitutionally or otherwise specially mandated.”28  
As a result, basic materials—such as the non-privileged portions 
of police notes or official investigation reports—were not included 
in the required discovery unless the prosecution intended to 
introduce them at trial.29 
Apart from the eleven enumerated categories, much of what 
defendants received came from constitutionally mandated mini-
mum safeguards rather than statutory provisions.  For example, 
the old statue did not include a provision requiring the disclosure 
of exculpatory evidence but rather directed prosecutors to comply 
with constitutional requirements without further guidance.30  
This provision had been interpreted as requiring the prosecution 
to turn over “material” exculpatory evidence, which would have 
created a “reasonable possibility” of a different outcome.31  By con-
trast, discovery laws in many other states require the prosecu-
tion to disclose all exculpatory information rather than just that 
exculpatory evidence which is determined to be material by the 
 
26 7 LAWRENCE K. MARKS, NEW YORK PRETRIAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 7:50 
(2d ed. 2019) (commonly referred to as the “DiFiore Order”); see also Janet DiFiore, 
Chief Judge of the State of N.Y., State of Our Judiciary Address 9 (Feb. 6, 2018), 
http://www.nycourts.gov/ctapps/news/soj2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/TER6-4QEJ]. 
27 See generally William C. Donnino, Practice Commentaries, N.Y. CRIM. PROC. 
LAW § 240.20 (McKinney 2014). 
28 People v. Colavito, 87 N.Y.2d 423, 427 (N.Y. 1996). 
29 People v. Finkle, 103 Misc. 2d 985, 986 (Sullivan Cnty. Ct. 1980); NYSBA 
REPORT, supra note 14, at 4. 
30 Ch. 412, § 2, 1979 N.Y. Laws at 1–2; see also Colavito, 87 N.Y.2d at 427 (“The 
CPL does not expressly compel pretrial discovery of evidentiary material . . . which 
the prosecution intends to introduce at trial.”).  
31 People v. Fuentes, 12 N.Y.3d 259, 263 (N.Y. 2009). 
534 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94:529   
prosecution.32  In addition to Brady material, witness identities 
and statements are often at the heart of a criminal case and 
would be central to any defense investigation of the charges.  
While defendants were entitled to the names and pretrial state-
ments of prosecution witnesses as Rosario material, defendants 
had no right to the names, contact information, or statements of 
witnesses who had relevant information unless the prosecution 
chose to call them at a hearing or trial.33 
The compressed, trial-focused timeline for discovery and the 
limitations on discoverable materials were tied with the issue of 
prosecutorial readiness.  Under CPL section 30.30 the speedy tri-
al right in New York is tied to prosecutorial readiness, rather 
than a specified period of time.  A defense motion to dismiss must 
be granted when the prosecution fails to announce its readiness 
for trial within six months of the commencement of the action for 
a felony and ninety days for a Class A misdemeanor.34  After the 
prosecution announces that it is ready for trial, only the time 
requested by the prosecution is counted against it for section 
30.30 purposes.35  As such, a prosecutor may ask for a short, 
week-long adjournment, but the judge will often set the next date 
for a month or more due to the court’s calendar.36  Regardless of 
how long the actual adjournment is, only the week requested by 
the prosecution is counted for speedy trial time.37  Once the pros-
ecution announces their readiness for trial, the speedy trial 
“clock” stops.38  Prior to the enactment of article 245, prosecuto-
rial readiness and discovery were not linked, either in the statute 
or in the caselaw.39  In People v. Anderson, the prosecution an-
nounced its readiness for trial when substantial discovery, 
including Rosario material, a supplemental bill of particulars, 
and lab reports were still outstanding.40  The Court of Appeals 
held that the delay attributable to outstanding discovery obliga-
tions was not chargeable to the prosecution, because such a delay 
 
32 NYSBA REPORT, supra note 14, at 5 & n.11 (listing Arizona, California, 
Colorado, Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Texas, and Washington). 
33 Roberts, supra note 18, at 1129–30; see People v. Miller, 106 A.D.2d 787, 788 
(3d Dep’t 1984).  
34 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 30.30(1)(a)–(b) (McKinney 2019). 
35 Daniel Hamburg, A Broken Clock: Fixing New York’s Speedy Trial Statute, 48 
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 223, 247–48 (2015).  
36 Id. at 248. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. at 247–48. 
39 See People v. Anderson, 66 N.Y.2d 529, 541–42 (N.Y. 1985).  
40 Id. at 539.  
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did not affect the prosecution’s ability to proceed to trial, and be-
cause article 240 contained other remedies for such delays.41 
Because of the lack of any connection between discovery com-
pliance and speedy trial under the old statutes, prosecutors were 
able to announce ready prior to discovery disclosures.42  A decla-
ration of readiness without discovery put the defendant in the 
position of choosing between stopping the speedy trial clock her-
self and requesting adjournments while waiting for discovery, on 
the one hand, or proceeding to trial without the benefit of discov-
ery, on the other.  Assuming that the statement of readiness was 
not illusory, there was nothing objectionable about this practice 
under article 240.  Practically, this resulted in incarcerated de-
fendants remaining in pretrial detention without discovery mate-
rials or the prospect of release on speedy trial grounds.  Such 
delay without discovery often resulted in the inducement of ill-
informed guilty pleas as a means to get out of detention or to 
avoid the collateral consequences of an open case.43 
This structural disconnect between discovery compliance and 
readiness was problematic even when prosecutors made good-
faith statements of readiness and strove to comply with discovery 
obligations.  But, as demonstrated by internal training documents 
from the Bronx District Attorney’s Office, it was common practice 
for some offices to engage in gamesmanship with the explicit goal 
of stretching out a case prior to the fulfillment of their discovery 
obligations.44  The internal documents showed that Bronx ADAs 
were trained to announce readiness for trial at arraignment, and 
to request only minimal adjournments, relying on the court 
granting more time than was requested due to “court conges-
tion.”45  This practice was perfectly acceptable under the old 
 
41 Id. at 543. 
42 Readiness required a triable accusatory instrument, the availability of 
witnesses, and the removal of “all legal impediments to the commencement of [the 
prosecution’s] case.” John H. Wilson, When Are the People Ready? The Interplay 
Between Facial Sufficiency and Readiness Under CPL Section 30.30, 35 PACE L. REV. 
999, 1001 (2015).  
43 See infra notes 147–150 and accompanying text.  
44 George Joseph & Simon Davis-Cohen, Internal Documents Reveal How Bronx 
Prosecutors Are Taught To Slow Down Cases, APPEAL (Aug. 2, 2018), https://theappeal 
.org/internal-documents-reveal-how-bronx-prosecutors-are-taught-to-slow-down-cases/ 
[https://perma.cc/87WY-VCFV]. One training slide titled “THE POKER GAME” ad-
vised trainees to “[k]eep your poker game face on” because “you are ready” and “YOU 
WILL NEVER BE MORE READY THAN AT ARRAIGNMENTS OR THE FIRST 
TIME THE CASE IS ON AFTER ARRAIGNMENTS.” Id. 
45 Id. 
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discovery and readiness statutes.  Specifically, one training slide 
advised trainee ADAs, “The People CAN be ready without having 
supplied discovery!! There will be consequences.  There may even 
be sanctions, but it: DOES NOT PRECLUDE A VALID STATE-
MENT OF READINESS.”46  As such, it was common for defen-
dants to find themselves incarcerated with no meaningful 
discovery, no indication as to the strength of the prosecution’s 
case, and no prospect of release on speedy trial grounds.47  The 
lack of discovery combined with illusory statements of readiness 
set the stage for uninformed guilty pleas, regardless of the 
defendants’ factual guilt or innocence. 
The training materials distributed by the Bronx District 
Attorney’s Office speak to a larger problem with the old discovery 
regime: insufficient consequences.  The consequences for noncom-
pliance were so minor and rarely applied in practice that they 
were functionally meaningless.  Discovery violations are, by their 
nature, difficult for the defense and courts to detect.48  In the 
cases where violations came to light, they were subject to strictly 
construed “materiality and harmless-error standards.”49  Although 
CPL section 240.70 set forth a number of possible sanctions for 
statutory violations,50 in practice the only remedies imposed were 
“adjournment[s] to investigate” or an “adverse inference.”51  Even 
where the prosecutor withheld exculpatory evidence until his 
closing statement, the Court of Appeals held that any error from 
the nondisclosure was cured by interrupting the closing state-
ment and allowing the defense time to recall a witness.52  As 
countless examples show, the delayed disclosure of evidence often 




48 Ben Grunwald, The Fragile Promise of Open-File Discovery, 49 CONN. L. REV. 
771, 781 (2017). 
49 Id. 
50 Criminal Procedure Law, ch. 412, § 2, 1979 N.Y. Laws 4 (repealed 2019). 
51 William C. Donnino, Practice Commentaries, N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 240.70 
(McKinney 2014); see, e.g., People v. Beam, 161 A.D.2d 1153, 1153 (4th Dep’t 1990) 
(failure to disclose “Brady material until the commencement of trial”); People v. 
Cunningham, 189 A.D.2d 821, 822 (2d Dep’t 1993) (delayed disclosure of ballistics 
evidence); People v. Hess, 140 A.D.2d 895, 896–97 (3d Dep’t 1988) (failure to disclose 
“an accident reconstruction report . . . until the eve of trial”); People v. Williams, 227 
A.D.2d 906, 906–07 (4th Dep’t 1996) (failure to disclose 911 tapes until less than one 
week prior to trial). 
52 People v. Smith, 63 N.Y.2d 41, 68 (N.Y. 1984). 
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In People v. Tovar-Ramirez, a Bronx County case, the defen-
dant was arraigned on misdemeanor charges on August 6, 2017.53  
Four court orders and 178 days later, the prosecution ultimately 
made its initial discovery disclosures on January 31, 2018.54  The 
defense moved to preclude the delayed evidence.55  The defense 
argued that “[i]t is very difficult, if not impossible, to properly 
determine the strength of a case without discovery” and that the 
multiple additional appearances necessitated by the delay “pres-
sure[d] [the defendant] to plead guilty” to avoid further court 
appearances.56  The court found that, despite the lengthy delay in 
disclosure, no sanction was warranted, because the defense was 
given the opportunity to examine the materials at issue before 
the matter proceeded to hearing or trial.57  The lack of meaning-
ful consequences for delay combined with the trial-based timeline 
and narrow scope of article 240 resulted in a statutory regime 
that was ill-suited to a plea-based system. 
B. Federal Criminal Discovery Practice 
Like article 240, federal discovery rules also feature trial-
focused timelines and narrow disclosure requirements.  Criminal 
discovery at the federal level is primarily governed by Rule 16 of 
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure as well as by constitu-
tional requirements from Brady and its progeny.58  Rule 16 does 
not codify the government’s discovery obligations under the 
Brady Rule.  However, Rule 16 requires the disclosure of docu-
ments and tangible objects “material to preparing the defense,” 
which has been interpreted as including evidence “favorable” to 
the defendant.59  Additionally, there is no timeframe for the dis-
closure of such evidence in Rule 16, meaning that the actual 
timing of Rule 16 disclosures varies based on local practice and 
internal policy. 
In terms of scope, Rule 16 provides for limited pretrial 
discovery.60  The statute enumerates five categories of discover-
 
53 People v. Tovar-Ramirez, 59 Misc. 3d 1061, 1062 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct. Bronx Cnty. 
2018). 
54 Id. 
55 Id. at 1062–63. 
56 Id. at 1063 (first alteration in original). 
57 Id. at 1066, 1068. 
58 See generally FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 
(1963); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972). 
59 FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(E)(i); see also Brady, 373 U.S. at 86–87. 
60 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(A)–(G). 
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able material which the government is required to disclose to the 
defense: oral and recorded statements of the defendant, the 
defendant’s prior criminal record, a limited category of docu-
ments and tangible objects, reports of examinations and tests, 
and material relating to the government’s expert witnesses.61  
This is an exclusive list that specifically does not require the 
disclosure of government documents or reports, including police 
reports.62   
While witness statements are not discoverable under Rule 
16, they are disclosed as Jencks material, which is similar to 
Rosario material, under the Jencks Act.63  In Jencks v. United 
States, the Supreme Court of the United States held that the 
defense was entitled to all reports of written and oral statements 
made by government witnesses, relating to the subject of their 
testimony.64  Almost immediately after the Court’s decision in 
Jencks, Congress passed 18 U.S.C. § 3500, the Jencks Act, which 
codified the substance of the Court’s holding but limited its 
practical use by requiring that no such statement shall be subject 
to discovery until after the witness has testified on direct 
examination.65  While many offices adopt internal policies and 
turn over Jencks material prior to trial in order to avoid midtrial 
delays,66 courts may not compel the production of such material 
prior to trial over the government’s objection.67  Given the timing 
provision of the Jencks Act, the defense may not receive any 
witness statements until after the witness has testified, render-
ing Jencks material all but useless for investigative and plea 
bargaining purposes. 
The statutory treatment of witness statements under the 
Jencks Act is emblematic of the lack of focus on the plea 
bargaining stage in traditional discovery practice.  Similar to 
article 240, the timeline and scope of federal discovery rules 
evince a trial-centric approach that fails to adequately serve a 
system in which less than four percent of defendants go to trial.68  
 
61 Id. 
62 FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(2). 
63 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (2018). 
64 353 U.S. 657, 668–69 (1957). 
65 18 U.S.C. § 3500(a), (b). 
66 See infra notes 102–103 and accompanying text. 
67 See United States v. Percevault, 490 F.2d 126, 128–29 (2d Cir. 1974). 
68 See infra note 142 and accompanying text.  
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C. Broadening of New York Discovery Practice Under the New 
Statute 
By contrast, article 245 includes a requirement of automatic 
discovery no later than twenty days after arraignment for incar-
cerated defendants and no later than thirty-five days for all 
others.69  Article 245 requires functional “open file” discovery 
from the prosecution.  Prosecutors are required to disclose “all 
items and information that relate to the subject matter of the 
case.”70  Additionally, the statute includes a non-exhaustive list 
of twenty-one specific types of material which must be disclosed, 
using broad “including but not limited to” language.71  Article 245 
imputes possession of material and information in the custody of 
New York State law enforcement to the prosecution72 and re-
quires the free flow of information between the prosecuting office 
and law enforcement.73  The new statute includes a presumption 
of openness in favor of disclosure when interpreting the pro-
visions relating to the timing of discovery, disclosure prior to 
guilty pleas, and the scope of automatic initial discovery.74 
Unlike article 240 and the federal rules, the timeline for dis-
covery under article 245 is tied to arraignment and reflects the 
reality that most defendants will not go to trial.  Under article 
245, the required prosecution disclosures are to take place “as 
soon as practicable” but not later than twenty calendar days after 
the arraignment of an incarcerated defendant or thirty-five days 
for defendants at liberty, on any charging instrument, including 
misdemeanor and felony complaints.75  However, this deadline 
may be extended by an additional thirty days without a motion 
where the material in question is “exceptionally voluminous” or 
where such material is not in the possession of the prosecution, 
“despite diligent, good faith efforts” to locate same.76 
 
69 The deadline was originally fifteen days after arraignment for all offenses. 
However, this timeline was extended in the Fiscal Year 2021 budget legislation. The 
deadline remains fifteen days from arraignment for Vehicle and Traffic Law 
violations and other petty offenses. See Ch. 56, pt. HHH, § 1(a)(i)–(iii), 2020 N.Y. 
Laws (2020 McKinney’s Session Law News of N.Y.). 
70 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 245.20(1) (McKinney 2019). 
71 Id. § 245.20(1)(a)–(u). 
72 Id. § 245.20(2). 
73 Id. § 245.55(1). 
74 Id. § 245.20(7). 
75 Id. § 245.10(1)(a); Ch. 56, pt. HHH, § 1(a)(i)–(iii), 2020 N.Y. Laws (2020 
McKinney’s Session Law News of N.Y.). 
76 CRIM. PROC. § 245.10(1)(a). 
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The new discovery law also addresses the problem of readi-
ness without discovery.  The new speedy trial statute, which was 
passed with the discovery reforms, requires prosecutors to file a 
certification of good faith compliance with the section 245.20 
discovery disclosures in order to announce ready for trial and 
affords defense counsel the opportunity to be heard on the record 
as to the status of the disclosure.77  By tying readiness to discov-
ery compliance, defendants are no longer forced to choose be-
tween proceeding to trial without any meaningful discovery and 
waiving their speedy trial rights. 
Although the changes to both the scope and timing of 
discovery disclosures represent a dramatic change from prior 
practice, they are not inflexible requirements.  Article 245 allows 
either party to obtain a protective order on the record, ex parte, 
or in camera upon a showing of good cause.78  This provision 
grants broad judicial discretion in terms of the type of remedy a 
court may impose, stating that any kind of discovery may be 
“denied, restricted, conditioned or deferred” or may be subject to 
“such other order as is appropriate.”79  The party seeking a pro-
tective order is entitled to expedited appellate review of an 
adverse ruling.80  In addition to protective orders, the court may 
alter the timeline for discovery upon motion from either party, 
showing good cause.81 
In one of the most dramatic shifts from the old rule, article 
245 requires the prosecution to complete discovery no later than 
three days prior to the expiration of a pre-indictment plea offer 
and no later than seven days prior to all other plea offers.82  If the 
prosecution fails to make necessary disclosures before the ex-
piration of an offer, the court is required to consider, upon 
defense motion, “the impact of [such a] violation on the defen-
dant’s decision to accept or reject [the] offer.”83  Furthermore, if 
the court finds that the violation materially affected the defen-
dant’s decision, the prosecution must either reinstate the offer or 
the court must preclude the admission of any improperly 
withheld evidence at trial “as a presumptive minimum sanction.”84  
 
77 Id. § 30.30(5). 
78 See id. § 245.70. 
79 Id. § 245.70(1). 
80 Id. § 245.70(1), (6). 
81 Id. § 245.70(2). 
82 Id. § 245.25(1)–(2). 
83 Id. 
84 Id. 
2020] BARGAINING WITHOUT THE BLINDFOLD 541 
Additionally, while defendants who plead guilty may waive their 
rights to discovery, a “plea offer may not be conditioned upon 
such [a] waiver.”85  This is significant, given that, before discov-
ery reform, such waivers were ubiquitous in plea agreements.86 
The pre-plea discovery provision goes well beyond the re-
forms recommended by the New York State Bar Association’s 
Task Force on Criminal Discovery report from 2015.87  In that re-
port, NYSBA specifically declined to recommend a statutory pre-
plea obligation to complete discovery.88  Given the overwhelming 
prevalence of plea agreements, a statutorily based, enforceable 
obligation to provide discovery prior to the expiration of a plea 
offer has profound implications for criminal practice overall. 
II.  VARIOUS APPROACHES TO CRIMINAL DISCOVERY REFORM 
In both New York and the federal system, prosecutors and 
local courts have made attempts to ameliorate the effects of exist-
ing discovery rules through internal policies and local rules. 
A. New York Internal Policies 
Until the passage of the new discovery statute, the level of 
variance from the provisions of article 240 depended on the 
internal policies of District Attorneys’ Offices at the county level.  
In New York City, the variations in discovery practices between 
Brooklyn and Manhattan represent the most liberal and most 
restrictive standards, respectively.  Even under the old discovery 
regime, a defendant arrested on the Kings County side of the 
Brooklyn Bridge would have received broad discovery com-
paratively early through voluntary disclosures, whereas on the 
Manhattan side of the bridge, that same defendant would have 
received little more than what was required by the strict letter of 
article 240.89  Brooklyn has a long-standing internal policy of 
“open file” or voluntary discovery.90  Under the Brooklyn policy, 
defense counsel typically received the police report, along with 
 
85 Id. 
86 See Daniel P. Blank, Plea Bargain Waivers Reconsidered: A Legal Pragma-
tist’s Guide to Loss, Abandonment and Alienation, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 2011, 2011 
(2000).  
87 NYSBA REPORT, supra note 14, at 50. 
88 Id. 
89 Dan Svirsky, The Cost of Strict Discovery: A Comparison of Manhattan and 
Brooklyn Criminal Cases, 38 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 523, 524 (2014). 
90 NYCLA SURVEY, supra note 22, at 8. 
542 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94:529   
any case updates, body-worn camera footage, 911 recordings, 
photographs of injuries or property damage, and surveillance 
footage within four to six weeks of the filing of an indictment or 
misdemeanor information.91  However, other than a broad com-
mitment to “open file” discovery, Brooklyn apparently did not 
have a specific written discovery policy delineating material that 
prosecutors were required to disclose.92   
By contrast, discovery practice in Manhattan was far more 
restrictive under article 240 and more closely mirrored the text of 
the statute.  Manhattan prosecutors provided a Voluntary Dis-
closure Form (“VDF”) in response to discovery demands in 
omnibus motions.93  Defense practitioners generally did not re-
ceive discovery until the eve of hearing or trial.94  In misdemean-
or cases particularly, VDFs were typically not disclosed until 
immediately before the People announced ready for trial.95  
Moreover, defense attorneys characterized the VDFs received in 
response to motions as “incomplete,” “non-responsive,” and often 
inaccurate.96  Additionally, defense attorneys reported that the 
scope and timing of pretrial discovery disclosures depended 
greatly on the individual ADA.97  The District Attorney’s Office 
indicated that there was no written discovery policy but that 
“judges and regular practitioners [were] aware of it through 
longstanding practice.”98 
Unlike the federal system, where discovery practices have 
broadened through judicially created rules, New York has seen 
minimal judicial involvement in this issue.  Chief Judge of the 
New York Court of Appeals, Janet DiFiore, announced new rules 
regarding criminal discovery on November 8, 2017.99  However, 
other than reminding prosecutors and defense attorneys of their 
existing discovery obligations, the only new guidance was a 
 
91 Interview with Paul Magel, Staff Att’y, Brooklyn Defs. Servs., in Queens, N.Y. 
(Oct. 9, 2019). 
92 NYCLA SURVEY, supra note 22, at 8–9. 
93 Id. at 9. 
94 Id. 
95 Telephone Interview with Margaret Darocha & Amanda Barfield, Trial Att’ys, 
N.Y. Cnty. Def. Servs. (Oct. 11, 2019) [hereinafter Darocha & Barfield Interview]. 
96 NYCLA SURVEY, supra note 22, at 9. 
97 Darocha & Barfield Interview, supra note 95. 
98 NYCLA SURVEY, supra note 22, at 9. 
99 See generally Press Release, N.Y. State Unified Ct. Sys., Chief Judge DiFiore 
Announces Implementation of New Measure Aimed at Enhancing the Delivery of 
Justice in Criminal Cases (Nov. 8, 2017), http://ww2.nycourts.gov/sites/default/files/ 
document/files/2018-05/PR17_17.pdf [https://perma.cc/JJ9G-YXNJ]. 
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statement that disclosures are “presumptively ‘timely’ ” if made 
thirty days prior to trial or fifteen days prior to the hearing.100  
Without substantive statewide guidance, discovery practices be-
tween offices were a patchwork of unwritten and unenforceable 
discovery policies that varied from county to county and failed to 
provide either predictability or transparency. 
B. Federal Internal Policies and Local Rules  
In both individual district offices and at the national level, 
federal prosecutors have adopted internal policies based on both 
practical and equitable concerns, which provide for broader pre-
trial discovery than statutorily required.101  Regarding the Jencks 
Act, which does not require the disclosure of witness statements 
until after direct examination, one District Court Judge re-
marked, “[s]ince the Jencks Act is utterly impractical, it is 
routinely ignored.”102  Further, that judge noted that it was “com-
mon practice” for federal prosecutors in Massachusetts to 
“disclose Jencks Act materials voluntarily at the commencement 
of trial, if not before.”103  Individual United States Attorneys’ Of-
fices adopt their own formal or informal discovery procedures 
concerning Jencks material.  For example, in 1990, the United 
States Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of New York 
(“EDNY”) adopted a policy of voluntarily disclosing information 
related to the testimony of government informants in prior cases, 
although there was no requirement to do so.104  In 1999, a similar 
policy was adopted as a written manual by the United States At-
torney’s Office for the Northern District of California (“NDCA”), 
when one of the drafters of the original EDNY policy memo was 
 
100 N.Y. STATE JUST. TASK FORCE, REPORT ON ATTORNEY RESPONSIBILITY IN 
CRIMINAL CASES 16 (2017), http://www.nyjusticetaskforce.com/pdfs/2017JTF-
AttorneyDisciplineReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/MC8T-WALU]. 
101 See, e.g., Memorandum from David W. Ogden, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of 
Just., to Dep’t Prosecutors, Guidance for Prosecutors Regarding Criminal Discovery 
(Jan. 4, 2010) [hereinafter Ogden Memo], https://www.justice.gov/archives/dag/ 
memorandum-department-prosecutors [https://perma.cc/J9D8-NN62]; U.S. Dep’t of 
Just., Just. Manual § 9-5.001(C) (2020). 
102 Ellen S. Podgor, Criminal Discovery of Jencks Witness Statements: Timing 
Makes a Difference, 15 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 651, 678 (1999) (quoting United States v. 
Owens, 933 F. Supp. 76, 78 (D. Mass. 1996) (alteration in original)). 
103 Owens, 933 F. Supp. at 78. 
104 Eric S. Fish, Prosecutorial Constitutionalism, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 237, 273 
(2017); Alex Kozinski, Criminal Law 2.0, 44 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC., at iii, 
xxviii (2015). 
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serving as the head of the Criminal Division there.105  But that 
policy was abandoned as of 2002 following the appointment of a 
new United States Attorney in that district.106  At the national 
level, Department of Justice (“DOJ”) guidelines, located in the 
Justice Manual (formerly the United States Attorneys’ Manual) 
provide for pretrial discovery beyond the scope of Rule 16 in 
certain areas.107 
In addition to the Justice Manual, guidance on discovery is 
provided through internal memoranda.  In the wake of the infa-
mous prosecution of former Alaska Senator Ted Stevens, the DOJ 
established a working group to address policies related to dis-
covery and case management.108  Subsequently, Deputy Attorney 
General David Ogden issued a memorandum regarding criminal 
discovery practice.109  The Ogden memo emphasized the impor-
tance of prompt disclosures of exculpatory evidence and encour-
aged prosecutors “to provide broad and early discovery consistent 
with any countervailing considerations.”110  The memo included 
no specific guidance on the timing of such disclosures, merely 
encouraging prosecutors to exchange exculpatory information 
“reasonably promptly” and impeachment evidence “at a reasona-
ble time before trial.”111  Regarding pre-plea disclosure, the Ogden 
memo simply reminds prosecutors to “be attentive to controlling 
law in their circuit and district governing disclosure obligations 
at various stages of litigation.”112  Despite the fact that ninety-
seven percent of all federal convictions are the result of pleas,113 
both the Justice Manual and the Ogden memo focus almost 
 
105 Kozinski, supra note 104. 
106 Id. 
107 See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Just., Just. Manual, § 9-5.001(C) (2020). 
108 Ellen S. Podgor, Pleading Blindly, 80 MISS. L.J. 1633, 1633–34, 1646 (2011). 
Senator Stevens’s conviction on corruption related charges was ultimately set aside 
after evidence of prosecutorial misconduct, including the concealment of Brady 
material, came to light. Regarding the Ted Stevens prosecution, see generally, Report 
to Hon. Emmet G. Sullivan of Investigation Conducted Pursuant to the Court’s 
Order, Dated Apr. 7, 2009, In re Special Proceedings, 842 F. Supp. 2d 232 (D.D.C. 
2012) (Misc. No. 09-0198), http://legaltimes.typepad.com/files/Stevens_report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/NE57-Q9N2]. 




113 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2018 ANNUAL REPORT AND SOURCEBOOK OF FED-
ERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS 56 tbl.11 (2018), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/ 
files/pdf/research-and-publications/annual-reports-and-sourcebooks/2018/2018-Annual-
Report-and-Sourcebook.pdf [https://perma.cc/QHG5-FE69]. 
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exclusively on discovery practice in relation to trial.  Furthermore, 
although these internal policies provide for greater discovery 
than Rule 16 and Brady, neither the Justice Manual policies nor 
the memoranda guidelines are judicially enforceable “absent an 
‘independent constitutional’ basis” for relief.114  As such, if internal 
policies are ignored, there is virtually no recourse for criminal 
defendants.115 
The restrictive nature of both Rule 16 and the Jencks Acts 
has led judges in many districts to adopt local rules which 
broaden the scope of criminal discovery.116  A survey of federal 
local rules identified thirty-eight districts that broadened the 
scope of materials subject to disclosure and established timelines 
for the disclosure of Brady material.117  These local rules enumer-
ate further categories of discoverable material in addition to 
those in Rule 16 and eliminate the Rule 16 materiality require-
ment.118  Additionally, many local rules have incorporated an 
explicit Brady requirement, rather than merely referencing the 
government’s constitutional discovery obligations.119  In some dis-
tricts, the local rules broaden Brady “by eliminating the . . . 
‘materiality’ requirement” and instead mandating the disclosure 
of all evidence favorable to the defendant.120 
However, the weakness of district-specific rules is demon-
strated by the range of timing requirements for Brady material 
in such local rules.  The timeline for Brady disclosure in local 
rules runs the gamut from “within [fourteen] days after arraign-
ment” to “not less than [seven] days before trial” to “in time for 
effective use at trial.”121  Out of all of the districts with local dis-
covery rules, only Massachusetts requires any sort of pre-plea 
disclosure specifically.122  As such, while there is a trend toward 
 
114 Podgor, supra note 108, at 1636; Ellen S. Podgor, Department of Justice 
Guidelines: Balancing “Discretionary Justice,” 13 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 167, 
177 (2004) [hereinafter Podgor, Guidelines]. 
115 Podgor, Guidelines, supra note 114, at 177. 
116 See generally LAURAL HOOPER ET AL., A SUMMARY OF RESPONSES TO A NA-
TIONAL SURVEY OF RULE 16 OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND 
DISCLOSURE PRACTICES IN CRIMINAL CASES: FINAL REPORT TO THE ADVISORY 
COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL RULES 11–17 (2011); Daniel S. McConkie, The Local Rules 
Revolution in Criminal Discovery, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 59 (2017). 
117 HOOPER ET AL., supra note 116. 
118 McConkie, supra note 116, at 80. 
119 Id. at 80–81. 
120 HOOPER ET AL., supra note 116, at 11. 
121 Id. at 14–15. 
122 Id. app. B at 11. 
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the broadening of federal criminal discovery through local rules, 
the disparate approaches adopted by various districts has re-
sulted in inconsistent standards.  Moreover, the local rules are 
generally trial-centric and fail to address the issue of pre-plea 
disclosures.  
III.  THE WEAKNESSES OF NON-STATUTORY APPROACHES 
The problem of adapting a trial-based system of discovery to 
a plea-based system of criminal justice is best solved through 
legislative reform rather than local rules, prosecutorial policy, or 
reliance on constitutional jurisprudence.  Not only is a statutory 
approach consistent with the nature of discovery as a statutory 
right, but a judicially enforceable statutory requirement also 
serves as a legislative and judicial check on the prosecutorial 
power of the executive. 
While informal discovery policies put in place by prosecutors’ 
offices help to ameliorate the harshest effects of strict discovery 
practice, it cannot serve as a meaningful substitute for statutory 
reform.  The various discovery policies in New York under the old 
statute illustrate some of the pitfalls of reliance on informal 
practice.  These policies varied wildly from borough to borough and, 
in some cases, from ADA to ADA.123  Furthermore, the use of un-
written policies undermines both accountability and consistency.  
Even where such office-level policies are written, as is the case 
with some federal guidelines,124 they vary from district to district 
and may be rescinded at any time.125  Because such policies only 
exist at the pleasure of the specific District or United States 
Attorney, they provide limited predictability.  Both the vast de-
gree of variance between offices and the lack of transparency in 
the formation and application of such policies promote disparate 
outcomes.  Given how critical adequate discovery is for ensuring 
the fairness of pretrial procedure, “[c]ompliance with the govern-
ment’s disclosure obligations cannot be left to the political 
vagaries of [ninety-three United States] Attorneys’ offices and 
the countless District Attorneys’ offices across the country.”126 
In addition to being inconsistent and opaque, such internal 
policies are not judicially enforceable.  If individual prosecutors 
 
123 See supra note 97 and accompanying text. 
124 See, for example, the internal policy of disclosing prior testimony of infor-
mants adopted by the EDNY and NDCA as discussed in Kozinski, supra note 104. 
125 See, e.g., id.  
126 Id. 
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or bureaus choose to deviate from their internal guidelines, 
defendants are left with no recourse unless they can articulate 
“an ‘independent constitutional’ basis” for relief.127  The DOJ Jus-
tice Manual, for example, states that it “is not intended to, does 
not, and may not be relied upon to create any rights, substantive 
or procedural, enforceable at law by any party in any matter civil 
or criminal.”128  Without a mechanism for judicial enforcement, 
internal policies are of limited use in ensuring adequate pretrial 
disclosures.  However, local rules on discovery practices at the 
federal level also suffer from the problem of producing inconsis-
tent results across jurisdictions.  Although a judicially enforcea-
ble rule is preferable to an internal policy, district-level rules fail 
to solve the problem of geographic inconsistency.  As demonstrat-
ed by the wide range of timelines set for the disclosure of Brady 
material in various local rules, defendants relying on such rules 
will experience divergent practices depending on that court’s 
specific rule.129  
Faced with the inconsistency and unpredictability of local 
rules and internal policies, some scholars have called for the 
expansion of the Brady right to the realm of plea negotiation.130  
However, on a fundamental level, Brady is ill-suited for the task 
of promoting better informed and more accurate plea agreements.  
Compared to the broad pre-plea discovery required in statutes 
such as CPL section 245.25, Brady is an extremely limited right.  
The only disclosure required under Brady is of evidence that is 
both “favorable” to the defendant and “material either to guilt or 
to punishment.”131 
The materiality requirement both limits the scope of any 
discovery which may be developed by such a rule and continues 
the consolidation of prosecutorial power during plea negotiation.  
The materiality limit on Brady evidence requires the prosecutor 
to step into the role of the defense attorney to determine what 
may be “material” without knowledge of the defense theory of the 
case or trial strategy.132  The manner in which the term “material” 
 
127 Podgor, Guidelines, supra note 114. 
128 U.S. Dep’t of Just., Just. Manual, § 1-1.200 (2020). 
129 See HOOPER ET AL., supra note 116, at 14–15.  
130 See, e.g., Michael Nasser Petegorsky, Note, Plea Bargaining in the Dark: The 
Duty To Disclose Exculpatory Brady Evidence During Plea Bargaining, 81 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 3599, 3645–47 (2013). 
131 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). 
132 See Daniel S. McConkie, Structuring Pre-Plea Criminal Discovery, 107 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 14 (2017); see also United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 
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is defined by the prosecutor will determine the scope of discovery 
received by the defendant prior to trial.133  Judicially unenforce-
able internal policies encouraging prosecutors to err on the side 
of caution when making Brady disclosures are not sufficient.  
Furthermore, the Supreme Court’s suggestion in dicta that 
prosecutors avoid “tacking too close to the wind” when making 
Brady determinations is similarly insufficient because it neither 
provides substantive guidance to prosecutors nor creates any 
enforceable right for defendants.134 
In addition to the limitations imposed by the materiality 
requirement, Brady requires no disclosure of inculpatory evi-
dence,135 which is important both for ensuring that plea agree-
ments are fully informed and for inducing more accurate plea 
agreements earlier in the process.  Disclosure of inculpatory evi-
dence helps to ensure the disclosure of exculpatory evidence, 
which may not be recognized as such by the prosecutor.136  
Additionally, even for factually guilty defendants, the disclosure 
of inculpatory evidence is necessary to ensure fully informed 
guilty pleas.137 
On a structural level, Brady is a poor tool for pre-plea 
disclosure because it is a rule which is “enforced only retrospec-
tively” after a conviction has already been obtained.138  Post-plea 
Brady claims face a number of obstacles in practical applica-
tion.139  Brady claims after a guilty plea must show that the 
newly disclosed evidence in question was both favorable and 
material to guilt or punishment in the absence of a trial record.140  
Additionally, the level of skepticism demonstrated by the courts 
in finding nondisclosures “material” in Brady claims after a jury 
conviction will only be magnified after a defendant’s courtroom 
 
696–97 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (discussing the challenges faced by prose-
cutors in appreciating how evidence in their own files may be favorable to the 
accused). 
133 See H. Lee Sarokin & William E. Zuckerman, Presumed Innocent? Restric-
tions on Criminal Discovery in Federal Court Belie This Presumption, 43 RUTGERS L. 
REV. 1089, 1103 (1991). 
134 Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 439 (1995). 
135 Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. 
136 McConkie, supra note 132, at 13. 
137 See id. at 15 (discussing factors such as “the value of stolen goods,” the 
weight and “purity” of controlled substances, and “the actions of co-conspirators”).  
138 John G. Douglass, Fatal Attraction? The Uneasy Courtship of Brady and Plea 
Bargaining, 50 EMORY L.J. 437, 443 (2001). 
139 See id. at 478–83. 
140 Id. at 480. 
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confession of guilt.141  Brady, local rules, and internal policies are 
all inadequate vehicles for ensuring equitable pre-plea discovery 
when compared to a legislative approach that produces consis-
tent, transparent, and enforceable discovery rules. 
IV.  THE NEED FOR PRETRIAL DISCOVERY IN PLEA NEGOTIATIONS 
The overall liberalization of the New York discovery statute, 
taken together with the requirement for pre-plea disclosures, 
highlights both the ways in which traditional discovery methods 
fail to adequately serve a plea-based system and the importance 
of statutory reform.  Due to the sheer volume of cases which are 
resolved through pleas, the most critical phase of the process for 
criminal defendants has shifted from trial to plea negotiation.  
Ninety-six percent of all criminal cases in New York state and 
ninety-seven percent at the federal level are resolved via plea 
agreement rather than trial.142  Defendants who engage in plea 
negotiation in lieu of trial generally do so without the discovery 
which would be disclosed close to or on the eve of trial.143  
Additionally, plea agreements are often contingent upon the 
defendant’s waiver of her right to post-plea discovery.144  Such 
waivers prevent a defendant who has pleaded guilty from deter-
mining if, for example, Brady material was withheld prior to a 
plea. 
A threshold matter in any discussion of plea bargaining is 
recognition of the fact that factually innocent and factually guilty 
defendants plead guilty.  The National Registry of Exonerations 
identifies 547 cases to date of post-plea exonerations145 and the 
Innocence Project lists thirty-one individuals who pleaded guilty 
and were subsequently exonerated using DNA evidence.146  There 
 
141 Id. at 478–79. 
142 N.Y. STATE DIV. OF CRIM. JUST. SERVS., CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROCESSING RE-
PORT: CRIMINAL JUSTICE CASE PROCESSING, ARREST THROUGH DISPOSITION, NEW 
YORK STATE, JANUARY–DECEMBER 2017, at 23 tbl.11 (2018), http://www.criminaljustice 
.ny.gov/crimnet/ojsa/dar/DAR-4Q-2017-NewYorkState.pdf [https://perma.cc/APB8-
5GQ9]; U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 113. 
143 McConkie, supra note 132, at 5. 
144 See Blank, supra note 86, at 2011. 
145 NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, https://www.law.umich.edu/special/ 
exoneration/Pages/detaillist.aspx [https://perma.cc/SWZ4-NFAB] (filter “Tags” col-
umn to show only records containing tag “P”). 
146 When the Innocent Plead Guilty, INNOCENCE PROJECT (Jan. 26, 2009), https:// 
www.innocenceproject.org/when-the-innocent-plead-guilty/ [https://perma.cc/7WRL-
7PH2]; see also John H. Blume & Rebecca K. Helm, Essay, The Unexonerated: Fac-
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are numerous pressures on both factually innocent and factually 
guilty defendants to enter a plea, rather than risk going to trial.147  
Pretrial detention, recurring court dates, and the mere fact of 
having an open criminal case can disrupt the defendant’s life, 
leading to loss of employment or custody, as well as immigration 
consequences.148  Additionally, overcharging and charges which 
carry mandatory minimums push even factually innocent defen-
dants to plead guilty in order to avoid the possibility of vastly 
harsher punishment at trial.149  Innocent defendants may also 
plead guilty due to structural pressures which have the effect of 
penalizing defendants for going to trial.150  As such, pre-plea dis-
covery is necessary to ensure both procedural and substantive 
fairness.  
More robust pre-plea disclosures benefit defendants, prosecu-
tors, and the courts by promoting more accurate plea agreements 
and earlier plea agreements, and by supporting greater judicial 
economy.  The “shadow-of-trial” theory of litigation, which started 
as a civil concept, has been applied by scholars to criminal cases 
as well.151  Under this theory in the criminal context, rational 
parties will anticipate their chances at trial, discounted by the 
potential sentence in the event of conviction, and then use that 
calculus to come to a bargain.152  There are many complications 
in applying this theory of litigation to criminal cases, but the 
basic idea of plea negotiation as based on a risk assessment 
remains valid, in theory at least.153  However, in a system with 
 
tually Innocent Defendants Who Plead Guilty, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 157, 172–73 
(2014). 
147 Blume & Helm, supra note 146, at 173. 
148 See Paul Heaton, Sandra Mayson & Megan Stevenson, The Downstream Con-
sequences of Misdemeanor Pretrial Detention, 69 STAN. L. REV. 711, 713–14 (2017); 
see also Blume & Helm, supra note 146, at 173–74. 
149 Blume & Helm, supra note 146, at 180. 
150 See U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1(a)–(b) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 
2018) (offering a three-point reduction on the Offense Level if the defendant makes a 
prompt guilty plea before the government must begin trial preparations).  
151 The seminal work on this concept in the civil realm is Robert H. Mnookin & 
Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 
YALE L.J. 950 (1979). For its application to criminal law, see, for example, Frank H. 
Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining as Compromise, 101 YALE L.J. 1969 (1992), and 
Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 
1909 (1992). 
152 Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. 
REV. 2463, 2464 (2004). 
153 Id. at 2466–69 (critiquing the application of this model to plea bargaining in 
practice). 
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severe informational imbalances, criminal defendants are not 
able to make the sort of risk assessments envisioned by the 
shadow-of-trial theory of litigation.154 
Pre-plea disclosure can also induce earlier plea agreements 
in strong cases.155  It is not uncommon for defendants to refuse 
initial plea offers when they lack the benefit of pretrial discovery, 
prolonging negotiations until disclosures are made close to trial 
and thereby wasting resources.156  This idea of encouraging guilty 
pleas by providing greater information is at the heart of the 
federal practice of “reverse proffers.”157  During a reverse proffer, 
the prosecutor explains to the defendant the evidence marshaled 
against her, usually making disclosures beyond what is required 
by Brady and Rule 16.158  However, there are no formal policies 
regarding reverse proffers, meaning that the timing and scope of 
such sessions are determined by individual prosecutors.159  
Regardless, reverse proffers are useful for reaching earlier 
pretrial resolutions through plea agreements.160  By the same 
token, requiring pre-plea disclosure would also produce greater 
efficiency by leading “prosecutors to ‘weed out’ the weakest cases” 
earlier in the process.161   
When there is limited pre-plea discovery, there is an in-
centive for prosecutors to engage in a degree of “bluffing” in weak 
cases or cases where there are potential issues of admissibility of 
key evidence.162  Bluffing as used in this context does not refer to 
 
154 Id. at 2495; Douglass, supra note 138, at 449–50. 
155 See Milton C. Lee, Jr., Criminal Discovery: What Truth Do We Seek?, 4 U.D.C. 
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violations of legal or ethical rules.163  Rather, it refers to situa-
tions where the prosecutor has concluded in good faith that there 
is probable cause, but, for any number of reasons, is not con-
vinced that she would be able to prove the charges beyond a 
reasonable doubt at that time.164  Prosecutorial bluffing can “take 
many forms,” ranging from mere puffery to more overt practices, 
such as overcharging or bringing charges which carry a manda-
tory minimum to serve as leverage early on.165  It can also consist 
of more subtle practices, such as announcing trial readiness with-
out truly being prepared to go to trial, with the knowledge that 
they will receive additional time to prepare due to court backlogs, 
as was suggested by the Bronx DA training materials.166  This 
type of bluffing can be particularly effective against factually 
innocent defendants who lack the sort of personal knowledge of 
the allegations that a factually guilty defendant would possess.167  
Pre-plea discovery obligations both require prosecutors to make 
an earlier, more in-depth assessment of their case and allows 
defendants to negotiate on a level playing field. 
Pre-plea discovery promotes greater accuracy and fairness in 
plea agreements.  It is a well-accepted principle of negotiation 
theory that an imbalance in information creates an advantage for 
one side in the bargaining process.168  The plea bargaining pro-
cess is no exception, and defendants’ ability to negotiate depends 
on their access to information.  Historically, the prosecution has 
been afforded broad discretion to withhold pre-plea discovery, 
which can result in inequitable plea agreements, especially on 
weak cases.169   
On a structural level, the plea bargaining process consolidates 
the lion’s share of both the procedural power and substantive 
information in the hands of the prosecution, particularly without 
pre-plea discovery.  In this context, charging decisions, plea offers, 
sentencing recommendations, and, in the absence of a contrary 
statute or rule, discovery disclosures are all left to the discretion 
 
163 William F. McDonald et al., Prosecutorial Bluffing and the Case Against Plea 
Bargaining, in PLEA BARGAINING, 1, 21 (William F. McDonald & James A. Cramer 
eds., 1980). 
164 Id. at 4. 
165 See Ostrow, supra note 162, at 1584–87. 
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167 Bibas, supra note 152, at 2495. 
168 Douglass, supra note 138, at 449–50. 
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of the prosecution.170  This concentration of power largely removes 
the traditional “checks and balances” of power between the 
legislature, prosecution, trial and appellate judges, and juries.171  
A statutory requirement of pre-plea discovery introduces a legis-
lative counterbalance to the broad power held by the prosecution 
in this phase.  
Because there is “no general constitutional right” to criminal 
discovery, most criminal defendants who engage in plea nego-
tiation do so without the majority of discovery which they would 
have received otherwise.172  Although prosecutors may turn over 
early discovery depending on the jurisdiction and internal poli-
cies of their office, there are no enforceable pre-plea discovery 
standards unless they are created by local rule or statute.  Even 
the question of whether Brady applies to plea negotiation is the 
subject of a circuit split and has not been addressed by the 
Supreme Court.173  The lack of enforceable discovery require-
ments denies defendants the benefits of the protections afforded 
by due process and erodes the structural checks and balances of 
the criminal justice system. 
Critics have raised various arguments in opposition to broad 
pretrial discovery.  First among these arguments is concern about 
witness safety.174  In his testimony on the implementation of the 
criminal reform package, Manhattan District Attorney Cyrus 
Vance argued that the required disclosure of Rosario material 
and witness information would endanger witnesses and discour-
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171 Id. at 8. 
172 United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 629 (2002) (quoting Weatherford v. 
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Justice System Oversight: Hearing on “Preparing for the Implementation of Bail, 
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age cooperation with law enforcement.175  However, either party 
may obtain a protective order upon a showing of good cause 
under article 245.176  In the event of an adverse ruling on an 
order of protection with regard to witness information, the party 
seeking the order is entitled to expedited review.177  Additionally, 
counties where the District Attorney’s office has adopted an 
internal open file discovery policy have not seen any impact on 
witness security.178  Brooklyn District Attorney Eric Gonzalez re-
marked that “[o]ur ‘open file discovery’ practice has not resulted 
in the negative outcomes some reform opponents fear.  The safety 
of victims and witnesses is not compromised by our practice and 
they are not discouraged from coming forward.”179  Furthermore, 
other states that require even broader disclosure of witness 
information by statute have not experienced the type of witness 
intimidation or tampering which has been cautioned against 
here.180  The use of protective orders ensures witness safety with-
out needlessly denying vital information to the defendant.  
Requiring a showing of good cause before a judge and allowing 
for ex parte applications and expedited review of adverse rulings 
balances the interests of the defendant and the prosecution, all 
the while preserving witness safety. 
Opponents of broad pretrial disclosure also argue that the 
expense of early discovery makes such a requirement cost pro-
hibitive.181  However, this argument is without merit.  While the 
initial implementation of new requirements may have required 
additional funding for the transition period, broad and early 
discovery is likely to promote greater judicial and prosecutorial 
economy of resources over time.  Formalized pre-plea discovery 
promotes efficiency by inducing earlier pleas in strong cases and 
earlier dismissals in weak cases.  Delayed disclosure, or even strict 
compliance with restrictive discovery rules, can result in costly 
delays and continuances.182  Strict compliance with the statutory 
timeline in the Jencks Act, for example, would result in disrup-
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176 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 245.70(1) (McKinney 2019). 
177 Id. § 245.70(6). 
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tive midtrial delays and adjournments to allow for defense in-
spection of the newly disclosed material.183  An automatic and 
standardized process for discovery eliminates the expense of 
motion practice for the prosecution, the defense, and the courts.184  
Additionally, other states have statutory requirements that go 
beyond the disclosures required in article 245, yet there is “not a 
shred of evidence that these criminal justice systems have 
suffered any drop in efficiency as a result.”185  Furthermore, 
voluntary internal practices of early and broad disclosure, such 
as open file discovery in Brooklyn and the practice of offering 
reverse proffers at the federal level, indicate that the costs are 
outweighed by the benefits.186  
CONCLUSION 
Unlike the alternative approaches to discovery reform, statu-
tory reform creates a judicially enforceable right and consistency 
across jurisdictions.  A statutory requirement for pre-plea discov-
ery, as seen in New York CPL section 245.25, rebalances the 
distribution of power in the plea bargaining context by imposing 
a legislative check on the prosecutorial power of the executive.  
Additionally, statutory reform promotes fairness at a broader 
level by ensuring that defendants in different jurisdictions have 
access to the same type of discovery.  One of the guiding princi-
ples of criminal justice policy is the avoidance of disparate out-
comes for similarly situated defendants.  Without reasonably 
equal access to pre-plea discovery, there will be dissimilar out-
comes for defendants in similar cases.187 
There is no doubt that the regulation of pretrial discovery 
practice involves a complex balancing of interests.  This weighing 
of competing interests is precisely why the problem of discovery 
in the pretrial context calls for a legislative solution, rather than 
a judicial or prosecutorial one.  Because this is essentially a 
policy question, it is the proper role of the legislature, not 
prosecutors, to gather input and establish a rule that balances 
the practical and ethical concerns at issue. 
 
183 Id. 
184 McConkie, supra note 132, at 18; Svirsky, supra note 89, at 527. 
185 Richard A. Rosen, Reflections on Innocence, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 237, 274. 
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While the discovery deficits in Mr. Gills’s robbery case did 
not prevent him from being acquitted after trial, he is an excep-
tion to the rule.188  The deficiencies of traditional pretrial discov-
ery practice are not cured by the procedural safeguards of a trial 
for more than ninety-five percent of defendants who take a 
plea.189  In a system where plea negotiation is the norm for the 
overwhelming majority of defendants, it is both unrealistic and 
unfair to maintain a trial-centric system of discovery.  A creature 
of statute from birth, criminal discovery is most appropriately 
reformed through legislative action. 
 
188 See supra Introduction. 
189 See supra note 142 and accompanying text. 
